2019年4月29日，下午18点21分。我又去了一次苏州

4月22日，我跟傅建军一起去了苏州。这是2017年6月，傅建军摔伤以来，我们两个第一次一起出远门。早在2017年10月，本来傅建军也是跟我一起去苏州的，但是后来她阻止我去苏州，在我早餐的面条里加了很多药https://ytilauxes.blogspot.com/2017/10/20171024950.html，结果一大早我就昏昏欲睡，差点连走路都走不了。而傅建军不知何故，居然跟我吵了一架，最终我提出她还是别去苏州了，没想到她居然同意了。就这样，那次她没去苏州


因为有了2017年6月的经历，其实我很抗拒跟傅建军一起出远门。我总是担心她又因为不小心而再次摔跤。另一方面，出门在外，纯粹是我自己心里不放心。比如刚出门，我就总是担心地铁会不会出故障，微博里经常报道上海地铁出故障的信息。而乘车我又担心出车祸。如果坐火车飞机我也会担心出事故。哪怕住宿，在酒店里要乘电梯，我也会担心电梯故障，致使我有可能从高空摔下去


再加上我的脚后跟面积比别人的小，我的平衡能力不好，出门在外，我从来不去山山水水道路崎岖不平的地方


其实按我自己的心思，我最好不要出门，就在家门口附近待着，不要乘车，不要乘地铁，不要乘坐火车飞机等交通工具，即便在家门口附近待着，我也只能生活在城市，而不应该走山路


说了这么多，其实我想说的是，出门几天，其实我的神经高度紧张，最终只有回家以后神情才能轻松一点。所以在外面，我根本没心思好好游玩


苏州其实挺大的，第一次去苏州，印象并不是最好的https://ytilauxes.blogspot.com/2017/10/20171024950.html，我曾写过，苏州无锡杭州等城市，我最喜欢的是杭州，其次无锡，最后才是苏州


这次我对苏州的印象依然没有提升。


有本书叫世界是平的，这书的观点可以体现在中国的很多城市里。比如苏州，不管是在旅游景区还是商业区，大多大同小异，跟其他城市的旅游景区或商业区，看起来没什么不同。那些旅游区的食物，纪念品，在苏州买在杭州买跟在无锡或其他城市买，都一个样子。食物种类也都是差不多的。比如上海的特色菜是鳝丝红烧肉虾仁，苏州菜也是上述是典型。小吃也是一样的，苏州的汤包生煎面条，跟在上海吃的味道都一样。苏州商业区的那些品牌，跟上海或者无锡杭州商业中心的品牌也一样。到处显眼的位置都是星巴克肯德基，苏州上海无锡杭州也一样


我特意观察了苏州的女生，发觉苏州的女孩子比上海的女孩子要时髦。我看到的女生几乎每个都把头发吹得很好，并化了精致的妆容。在上海的地铁站等，很难看到各个化过妆的女生


在苏州遇到了很多东北人，遇到东北人的频率就像在上海遇到外国人的频率那样，很频繁


苏州的有些地方看起来很富，比如金鸡湖畔，有些地方又看起来特别破旧，比如平江路周围


因为苏州没有自己有别于上海的特色，所以我在苏州除了吃饭乘车几乎不花钱


这次去苏州，花钱买门票的景点我去了一些，比如拙政园。但是人实在太多了，我总是担心出状况，所以在里面根本没心思游玩。照片也拍得不够理想。拙政园是四大园林之一，但是因为常年对游客开放，使得整个园区都未必有机会修整，所以看到的花草等都显得杂乱无章。因为人多的缘故，使得身处园区的人总是觉得园林有点太小


寒山寺我也去了。是个可以烧香拜佛的地方。但我却觉得不如北京的雍和宫


金鸡湖比杭州的西湖面积都大。金鸡湖周围却没怎么开发好。我们乘坐了电动车，沿着湖畔转了半圈，却也没拍到什么好的景色


不管在苏州还是中国的其他城市，有特色的不雷同的，大多是需要花大价钱才能体验到的。适合一般收入的景区，去哪里其实都一样


在苏州乘坐公共交通系统时，我发现苏州的老龄化现象很严重。苏州的财政收入对老年人实行老人乘公交车免费的福利，在苏州，至少有1/3的老人整天在乘坐公共交通。只有在商业区，那些出售年轻人品牌的地方，才能偶尔看见苏州的年轻人

2019年4月10日，下午14点32分。我看到一个叫陈永苗的精神有点失常的人，经常在他的政论文章里喋喋不休，诸如婚姻等话题

这个陈永苗，我注意了一下他的政治派系，比如他公开写过文章（文章观点也是我部分认可的），说是改革开放数十年来，是奴隶地位上升的年代，而我也有过类似表述，就是我认为上海本地的农民，上海的外来农民，上海的其他外来者这也包括外国人，都是地位上升的状态


陈永苗还另外很欣赏邓小平


他在他的文章中，经常精神失常那样，喋喋不休很多恐怖的话题


比如形容我在2006年6月26日及延续到2006年8月末，我被陌生人强奸一事，就在他的文章中，用，知识分子的经血，来形容我被强奸


后来我在网上提到这事，整个建立网络系统并进行监控的人员，我猜一定也是跟邓小平等幕僚有关，就把我发现陈永苗那么写的细节，告诉给陈永苗了


很快，陈永苗在国内的博客，删除了，文章中，带有，知识分子的经血，字样的博客


陈永苗还用非法的手段，去调查我的家庭背景。比如我自己记得很清楚，在1992年，前后一年，傅建军离婚，傅建军亲手写的离婚诉讼的诉状，其中她自己亲手亲口说，她自己被沈连根强奸。整个诉状我都看得清清楚楚


但是这份诉讼的诉状，其他人是看不到的。陈永苗却利用他有点特殊的身份，看到了当年的这份完整的诉状


于是陈永苗多次在自己的博客里，提及，婚姻，强奸导致的婚姻，因为强奸日子过不下去，没法好好过日子


诸如此类的描述


就好像陈永苗自己就是傅建军，就好像陈永苗自己就被强奸了，然后跟强奸他陈永苗的男人结婚了那样


看到陈永苗这样写，我当然也是在网上提了抗议


于是陈永苗在推特的账号，在新浪博客的账号，在价值中国网的账号，全都被这个由邓小平等幕僚建立起的互联网监控系统等，删除了


至于陈永苗还有其他账号被删除了吗，反正我也不知道


傅建军自己亲手亲笔写，自己被沈连根强奸，但其实她压根没被人强奸过。她跟沈连根的关系也还不错，离婚多年也能彼此心平气和见面说说话


这个陈永苗，不知道为什么那么积极，那些邓小平幕僚控制的监控系统，又不知道为什么就急于删除了陈永苗的各种账号


ps.涉及我被陌生人强奸，被删除的网站账号等，还包括一个叫gewenwei的猫咪论坛http://shenlei929.blogspot.com/2015/07/71.html，以及一个跟反对同性恋有关的网站https://www.anti-gay.org/。


而这个跟gewenwei有关的被删除的猫咪论坛http://forum.maomifadacai.com/，我记得我浏览过那个论坛，猫咪论坛里有许多时尚方面的话题，同性恋都很关注时尚，不知道gewenwei是不是也是个同性恋，总之gewenwei的网上行文风格，比较情绪化女性化

2019年4月9日，上午10点41分。China's Super Bank，书摘

这段以前我贴过，这本书也是诸多本书那样，我看到一半，傅建军用药物阻止我继续看下去


Wuhu officials bypassed the central government for approval of their pioneering plan,turning to the local People’s Congress—China’s answer to a town council—for approval.The city was greatly aided by Chen’s prestige.As Chen and the Wuhu officials saw it,they were creating a virtuous cycle.Public works like roads would boost home prices,which in turn would boost land prices.Higher land prices would mean more local government income,hence more spending.


CDB built Wuhu Construction into a giant;eventually its assets grew from 319 million to 21.4 billion yuan,and it bought equity stakes in 21 local companies, including Chery, which is now using CDB backing to expand into every corner of the developing world,from Africa to Latin America.“From then on,the Wuhu Model was extensively applied across the country,” the bank’s official history says,boosting urbanization,leaving a“precious legacy in the field of financing for urban infrastructure construction.”But what on earth had it started?CDB’slending to local governments did not crowd out other lenders of capital,as some say state-owned development banks can do.Instead,it sucked them all in.The model’ssuccess in Wuhu was replicated across the country,with CDB lending money to LGFVs in Shanghai(home to former president JiangZemin)and Tianjin (home to Premier WenJiabao)as well as the canal city of Suzhou.


One item few prospectuses omit:homage to CDB.Tianjin Binhai Construction and Investment Group,which was set up in 2005 in an agreement between the city and CDB,said it“relied on CDB from the outset.”Huainan Urban Construction Investment Co.in Anhui,which  won a 7.1 billion yuan loan from CDB at the beginning of 2008,said it relied on CDB loans to finance most of its projects.In Jiamusi,an Amur River city near the Russian border in Heilongjiang,a 2010 prospectus  bragged that the local investment company,Jiamusi New Era Infrastructure Construction Investment Group Co.,was“among the top 100 cities that get CDB support.” In the South,on the border with Myanmar,Yunnan Highway Development Investment Co.—more on them later—was created in 2006 through an agreement with CDB.


While Zhu Rongji’s 1994 reforms centralized tax collection,they  perversely allowed local governments greater control over the usage rights of land,allowing them to keep all land-leasing revenues.This growing,valuable state-owned resource was now totally in the hands of local governments,and they had no obligation to publish their budgets to the public.


The inequality in some cases has led to violence,far away from the confines of the state-banking system.That was certainly the case in Fuzhou,a city in JiangxiProvince,just to the east of Hunan.There,a land dispute with the government was central to a May 2011 bombing that killed three  people.Qian Mingqi allegedly set off three blasts at or near government buildings in the city amid a dispute over compensation he had been offered in a resettlement,according to reports by the official Xinhua News Agency.Qian died in one of the explosions. He had been asking for more compensation after being resettled in 2002 to make way for a highway. Three months before the bombings,Fuzhou’s investment vehicle went to the country’s bond market for the first time,raising 800 million  yuan.In its prospectus,in which it said it received CDB loans,the company said its main business included construction,land development,and“resettlement.”


The key was that Tianjin could use 15 years of land usage rights sales to secure the loan,both to act as collateral and as a source to pay back the funds.The city also had to promise to use its own infrastructure fund to pay back the money if land sales ran into difficulties.The bankers forecast that the land sales income would increase every year by 10 percent. That turned out to be a conservative bet:In reality,the income increased by 20 percent.By 2006,land income was 10.3 billion yuan,up from 2.4 billion yuan in 2004.By 2009,it was a different story:China Index Academy estimated the city’s land sales revenue was 73.2 billion yuan,a 67 percent increase over 2008.


While the out break of severe acute respiratory syndrome(SARS) in  2003 in Beijing intervened and prevented Chen Yuan from visiting  Tianjin to sign the deal,it was eventually signed in June of that year.The  original loan contract was signed with the city’s land bank;in 2004, the city set up an LGFV with four subsidiaries to handle the different  projects,including two subway lines,greening of the city,and riverside infrastructure development.The importance of land as collateral acted in the same way that CDB would use oil overseas in Africa and Asia.The  income from the subway,the book notes,only needed to cover operating costs;it doesn’t need to pay back the loan.The money to pay back the loan for all the projects will nearly all come from government income from selling land rights.The investment that CDB started helped bring in the property developers,too:The riverside construction project saw 10 billion yuan of investment in infrastructure but drew a total of 80 or more billion yuan of property construction,according to the book. Yet there’s a point where ambition and enthusiasm becomes recklessness and hubris,and Tianjin may have crossed that line.There’s no better place to witness the physical manifestation of hubris than Yu jiapu, Tianjin’s planned Manhattan.
Xu says the buildings in Yu jiapu are all being occupied by stateowned companies,including a steel company and a mining company turned realestate developer that is putting the finishing touches on Tianjin’s answer to Rockefeller Center.Asked if any private companies were setting up shop there,she pointed to a hotel.A giant billboard in Conch City—red background with white characters—quotes Chinese president Hu Jintao,who visited the area in April 2011,as saying“Put all your strength into storming the fort to win the battle of developing and opening the Binhai NewArea,work hard to become the lead soldiers in the battle to realize scientific development.”Not words you’d find in Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations.


To build Yu jiapu,Tianjin officials are piling onto borrowing that was already half a trillion yuan by the end of 2011—equivalent to half the annual per-capita income of the city’s 13 million people.More than 5,000 people were moved out of the area starting in 2008 to make way for the project,among the millions nationwide evicted from homes to make way for China’s urbanization projects.Tianjin  Binhai New Area Construction&Investment Group Co.sold 10 billion yuan worth of bonds in December 2011,earmarking 1 billion yuan from  the sale to fund the construction of the district’s transport hub,which includes a high-speed rail line that will cut travel time to Beijing to 45 minutes.In the first half of that year,its debt,mostly from bank loans and led by CDB,rose 11.9 percent from the end of 2010 to 71 billion yuan, according to a bond prospectus.To finish all the projects,more money is needed,said Tianjin’s vice mayor,Cui Jindu.


CDB’s lending to local governments stems from the failure of Zhu Rongji’s 1994 reforms ,which left local government swith huge spending burdens —everything from providing water to roads—but no  way to raise funds apart from leasing out state land.The prohibition set on borrowing by local governments was a rule observed only in the breach,just pushing the borrowing off the budget and into the arms of the state banks.Without any transparency,and with all of the capital from the state-owned banks rather than private institutions,the market has added no discipline.In one case,a Shanghai LGFV (Local Government Financing Vehicles )borrowed 2 billion yuan of loans for a high-speed railway project,but ended up using half the money for property projects.After the experience of the late 1990s,when many local government and state-owned enterprise loans were bailed out,the commercial banks were supposed to look after themselves,yet many of the projects they piled into led by CDB had poor returns.

There was a fundamental mismatch:The debts and the companies themselves were left off local government balance sheets,even as investors,banks,and ratings companies viewed them as having the implicit guarantee of local governments.Today,the LGFV's (Local Government Financing Vehicles )have dozens of subsidiaries,cross-holdings,and cross-guarantees,making it impossible to tell how much one local government is on the hook for if one linkin the chain is broken.Some LGFVs(Local Government Financing Vehicles ) have also turned into lenders,passing on money to property companies.While China wanted the institutions and infrastructure of a bond market,at the same time as it expanded, banks did their best to hollow out the integrity and effectiveness of those same institutions.Ratings agencies gave bonds sold by local government backed companies high ratings because they believed in the implicit back stop of the local government;investors took the yield as free money.At least the ratings agencies themselves were self-conscious enough to recognize the self-destructive behavior.“Who ever gives them the better rating gets the business,”Dagong’s fiery chairman,Guan Jiangzhong,told us.“This is very dangerous.”


While there is no way of telling what assets CDB was left with,the experience of cities like Chongqing,where GDP growth was16.4percent in 2011,showed that for all its problems,there is sheer genius behind the model.Chen Yuan of CDB had realized in 1998,before other banks, the force of urbanization and its role in economic growth.China long ago decided that the key to GDP growth is boosting productivity,and few economic events boost the productivity of a populace than moving them from life on a farm to life in the city.And that’s exactly what happened in Dawu village to Li Liguang.


The reliance on LGFVs(Local Government Financing Vehicles )  has also created one of the world’s biggest property bubbles:Nation wide,housing prices in China have risen at least by 140 percent since 1998.And unlike the welfare,health,and pension expenses that have crippled Europe,China’s forced urbanization has left a lot of debt before it even begins to deal with these expenses.By 2011, Standard Chartered was predicting that China’s debt levels were in reality around 71 percent of its 2010 GDP,approaching US levels.No one knew how far the debt extended,who else had lent to the companies,and who was liable.There was only one way that China would pay for this debt,and that would be through China’s savers,through higher tax,or through more inflation.